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1 Introduction
Acquisitions are a specific types of investment, and as shown in Fig. 1, acquisitions
often occur in peaks (Bruner 2002; Rappaport 1986). The recent peaks took place in
2000 and 2006 with worldwide deals climbing above billion $3,000 (Tscho¨ke and
Csanad 2007). The most common argument for pursuing acquisitions is to increase
the wealth of the shareholders of the acquiring company (Tuch and O’Sullivan
2007): acquisitions can create synergies, increase a firm’s market share and
bargaining power, or lead to improved risk diversification. Nonetheless, a large
number of M&A are considered as failures and do not succeed in increasing
shareholder wealth. While Bruner (2002, 2005) talks about 30% of deals failing,
Jansen (2002) estimates as high as 50–75%. Overall, the majority of empirical
literature on bidder performance in acquisitions has failed to provide consistent
evidence for increased shareholder wealth (Tuch and O’Sullivan 2007). After
reviewing the M&A literature focusing on merger policy in the US in great detail,
Mueller (1997) concludes: ‘‘It is possible, judging from the available evidence on
the effects of mergers, that the US economy would be as or even more efficient
today, if there had been no mergers over the last 50 years.’’ Sudarsanam (1995)
finds in the UK market that takeover gains are at best neutral for shareholders.1
The literature on M&A explains the failure of deals due to a false evaluation of
potential synergies when companies merge with or acquire other corporations (Ko¨ppen
and Knyphausen-Aufseß 2004; Roll 1986; Sirower 2001). Synergies may have
different sources. Financial synergies arise by reducing the cost of capital of the firm,
e.g., through tax benefits or improved leverage (Chatterjee 1986). Other sources of
Fig. 1 M&A waves in the last decades. Source: adopted from Mu¨ller-Stewens and Lechner (2003)
1 Sudarsanam’s (1995) review includes only four prior studies. His conclusions should be considered
with care.
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synergies are larger economies of scale and scope, enhanced efficiency or the gaining
of access to new markets, new customers or new technologies (Rumelt 1974; Salter
and Weinhold 1978). In this paper we do not explicitly pay attention to synergies
arising from economies of scope; instead, we focus on synergies that arise due to
relatedness, because in M&A projects the relatedness argument is far more common.
Usually, it is expected that synergies are highest in related acquisitions (Healy
et al. 1997, p. 45). They are often a negotiating point between buyer and seller that
impacts on the final price both parties agree upon. Therefore, corporate synergies
have to be forecasted through careful estimations in order to protect shareholders
from significant wealth destruction through acquisitions.
To forecast synergies the degree of similarity between two firms is often used
(Lubatkin and Srinivasan 1997).2 It is assumed that in the case of so called ‘‘related’’
acquisitions the management has a sound understanding of the firm to be acquired
because of its similarity (Flanagan and O’Shaugnessy 2003). However, relatedness can
embrace different sources which can be divided into business, cultural, technological,
and size relatedness. The effect of these four sources of synergies is unclear. This might
explain why some authors find strong positive effects between relatedness and the
profitability of acquisitions (Flanagan 1996; Healy et al. 1997; Morck et al. 1990; Singh
and Montgomery 1987), whereas others diagnose the opposite (Hambrick and Cannella
1993; Limmack and McGregor 1995; Sudarsanam et al. 1996).
Our study contributes to M&A research by answering the question as to when
relatedness is a source of potential synergies. We first summarize prior research
results on the effect of relatedness on the success of M&A. Secondly, in a meta-
analysis, we determine the degree to which shareholder wealth can be explained by
business, cultural, technological and size relatedness. Our overall findings indicate
that commonly agreed sources of synergies seem to have only a small impact.
Relatedness does not automatically increase shareholder wealth. Simply referring to
similar business concepts, cultures, technologies or sizes is not adequate for
forecasting synergies. Our detailed analysis of how relatedness influences different
performance measurements and of how its influence varies depending on different
regions or industries, leads to the conclusion that relatedness can be a cause of
wealth creation as well as of wealth destruction. As a consequence more attention
should be paid to different performance measures (and thus to different investor
types) and to the contingencies under which relatedness increases or decreases the
performance of firms engaging in M&A activity.
In the following sections, we develop a set of hypotheses regarding mechanisms
through which relatedness affects M&A performance and we test them using meta-
analytic techniques. The meta-analytic approach provides an integration of the
previous body of work and may help explain the inconsistent findings obtained in
previous studies.
2 This is in contrast to financial synergies, where dissimilarity of firms is considered to be the most
important source of benefits (Chatterjee 1986). ‘‘In sum, mergers of similar firms tend to have greater
financial synergies when the correlation of cash flows is low and volatilities are somewhat lower than the
base case’’ (Leland 2007). Unfortunately, cash flows in related acquisitions tend to be correlated by
definition because the acquisition takes place in a similar or at least linked business. That is why financial
synergies are most likely to be achieved in unrelated diversification.
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In Sect. 2 we present arguments and empirical evidence for synergies that may
arise from the aforementioned four forms of relatedness. In Sect. 3 we describe the
meta-analytic method. The major difference to prior meta-analyses is that our meta-
analysis compares the effect of four relatedness dimensions on acquisition
performance and acknowledges the multi-dimensionality of acquisition perfor-
mance. In addition to the standard accounting and market based indicators, we
employ knowledge indicators such as patents, new product developments and others.
Section 4 presents the statistical results. Section 5 discusses the findings. Section 6
concludes that other explanations for the negligible overall effect of relatedness on
acquisition success should be combined with the relatedness-hypothesis.
2 Literature review and research framework
In the following we do not distinguish between the various ways of acquiring
control rights3 because this distinction is important only to lawyers, accountants,
and tax specialists, and less relevant in terms of its economic impact (Bruner 2002,
p. 1). Consequently, we use the general term ‘‘mergers and acquisitions’’ (M&A) or
simply ‘‘acquisition’’.4
Figure 2 presents the model guiding this study. It focuses on synergy realization
as a result of similar patterns of resource allocations and similar dominant logics
(Harrison et al. 1993; Prahalad and Bettis 1986) as reflected in M&A performance.
Rumelt (1974) was among the first to distinguish different levels of relatedness
ranging from the single business firm to the conglomerate firm.5 He finds that
related diversifiers perform better than unrelated ones. This study triggered a host of
empirical research analyzing the relatedness-performance relationship.6
3 According to Jensen and Ruback (1983) a takeover is defined as a transfer of the target’s control rights
from the target’s management team to the bidding firm’s management. Such activities take place on the
market for corporate control: managers’ fears of becoming a target act as a control mechanism effectively
aligning their interests with those of the shareholders. The term ‘‘acquisition’’ is a mere purchase (of
control rights) whereas the term ‘‘merger’’ describes the combination of two firms to one legal entity that
have been different legal entities before (see, e.g. Bruner 2002, p. 1). Berkovitch and Khanna (1991)
define a merger as an offer made to the target’s management. The merger offer leads to bargaining
between the two parties. Negotiations take place in relative secrecy. In contrast, a tender offer is made
directly to the target’s shareholders and conveys more information to the public. Another way to acquire
control over a target firm is the proxy contest in which the amount of voting rights is decisive (Bebchuk
and Hart 2001).
4 Most of the studies we included in the meta-analysis do also not explicitly distinguish between
acquisitions and mergers and use the general term M&A. Other authors treat M&A the same way (Gugler
et al. 2003).
5 Rumelt’s typology includes the major categories: dominant business, related constrained, related linked
and unrelated (conglomerate) businesses and has been applied in various studies (Baysinger and
Hoskisson 1989; Bettis and Hall 1982; Montgomery and Singh 1987).
6 For example, Datta et al. (1991) review the literature on diversification and find inconclusive evidence.
Palich et al. (2000) conduct a meta-study and establish an inverted U-curve, i.e. diversification is
profitable when a firm has been a single business firm and then diversifies into related businesses. But
diversification lowers profitability when the firm switches from related to unrelated diversification. In the
following sections we present some conflicting findings on the effects of the relatedness variables on
acquisition performance.
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The M&A-literature discusses the impact of four major kinds of relatedness on
acquisition success: business relatedness (Kusewitt 1985; Rumelt 1974), size
relatedness (Hagedoorn and Duysters 2002; Hitt et al. 1991), cultural relatedness
(Buono et al. 1985; Chatterjee et al. 1992), and technological relatedness (Cassiman
et al. 2005; Hagedoorn and Duysters 2002). In the following sections we review the
hypothesized impact of each kind of relatedness on acquisition success.
As shown in Fig. 2, in the empirical analysis we will test for the effects of
relatedness on different performance types, commonly measured in terms of
shareholder value, accounting-based performance, amount of skill transfer and
combination, overall acquisition performance, and the divestment of the acquired
company by the parent. In addition we develop other performance classifications for
buyer and target. Finally, we test for moderating effects.
2.1 Business relatedness
Business relatedness concerns acquisitions in similar markets and industries. The
idea is to transfer knowledge generated in the old business to the newly acquired
one. Existing knowledge facilitates a realistic estimation of operational synergies,
reduces unit costs due to the use of existing distribution channels for products and
protects from overpayments (Montgomery and Singh 1987). It also reduces risk
because income streams become more stable when acquisitions occur in related
product markets (Salter and Weinhold 1978). Furthermore, the number of potential
rivals decreases and the market power of the combined firm increases. Practitioners
follow this line of thought.
Results demonstrating the profitability of the acquisition of related businesses are
mixed. Using ROA as a dependent variable Kusewitt (1985) finds a positive effect
in related acquisitions. Pennings et al. (1994) and Miller (2006) find similar effects
employing return on capital, R&D intensity and ROA as dependent variables. Davis
et al. (1992) conclude that both market and production relatedness provide benefits
H1, H2, H3, H4
Relatedness between acquirer 
& target
• Business relatedness
• Cultural relatedness
• Technology relatedness
• Size relatedness   
Absolute size of the acquirer
(control variable)
M&A Performance
• Shareholder value
• Accounting performance
• Skill transfer & combination 
• Overall acquisition performance
• Longevity
Moderators:
• Knowledge-intensity of the industry
• Acquisition Size
• Region 
Other Perform. Classifications
• Time effects (time windows, 
pre- & post-M&A Performance)
• Target/ Buyer effects
Fig. 2 Analyzed impact of relatedness on M&A performance
Do synergies exist in related acquisitions? 79
123
to the firm. They also find that production relatedness is more effective when aiming
at profitability instead of sales. Gugler et al. (2003) analyze a worldwide sample of
M&As with respect to profits and sales and conclude that related mergers perform
better than conglomerate or vertical ones. In contrast, other authors employing both
R&D intensity and ROA do not find positive effects in related acquisitions
(Harrison et al. 1993).
In developing our working hypothesis, we follow Tuch and O’Sullivan (2007),
who conclude after a review of the literature on M&A and performance that there is
some support for a positive effect on wealth creation in business related
acquisitions:
Hypothesis 1 Business relatedness has a positive effect on acquisition
performance.
2.2 Cultural relatedness
Managers often disregard the importance of an acquisition’s cultural impact
(Chatterjee et al. 1992). However, integration costs seem to be considerably lower
when similar corporate cultures are combined, resulting in a positive impact on the
acquisition performance (Larsson and Finkelstein 1999). Synergies arise from
similarity in decision making processes, informal controls and norms that govern
behavior (Datta 1991). When the ‘way the work is done’ is similar, misinterpre-
tations of motives and intentions as well as interpersonal conflicts are reduced
(Bruton et al. 1994). Cultural distance should be avoided (Larsson and Lubatkin
2001) because the target’s culture tends to be changed according to the acquirer’s
cultural preferences (Chatterjee 1986) with dysfunctional consequences for the
integration process (Buono et al. 1985).
These findings are supported by many studies which show a positive impact on
firm performance stemming from cultural relatedness (Cloodt et al. 2006;
Hagedoorn and Duysters 2002; Morosini et al. 1998; Slangen 2006; Vermeulen
and Barkema 2001). However, other authors find a negative effect in cultural
relatedness (Buono et al. 1985; Chatterjee et al. 1992). They explain this finding by
the knowledge-advancing effect of diversity. In a meta-analysis, Stahl and Voigt
(2008) show that cultural relatedness (a) in nine M&A-studies has an positive
impact on announcement effects measured as cumulative abnormal returns (CARs),
but (b) in 15 M&A-studies has no effects on the accounting performance of a firm.
Based on the argument, that integration costs are lower when firms combine
similar corporate cultures, we derive the following working hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2 Cultural relatedness has a positive effect on acquisition
performance.
2.3 Technological relatedness
The ‘‘relatedness’’ argument has also been discussed with respect to technology and
innovation. The question is whether innovations are triggered due to a better usage
of similar technologies or enhanced employment of different knowledge bases.
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Synergies might arise due to the accumulation of similar or complementary
operations (Larsson and Finkelstein 1999). Synergies from accumulating similar
operations are achieved by reduction in unit costs and the prevention of
inefficiencies due to time consuming learning efforts. However, synergies, e.g.,
the development of new products might also be elicited by the combination of
complementary resources.
The ‘economies of sameness’ argument is supported by different studies (Capron
and Mitchell 2000; Markides and Williamson 1994; Puranam and Srikanth 2007).
Hagedoorn and Duysters (2002) find positive effects in technological similarity
which they attribute to similar knowledge management mechanisms. However,
Cassiman et al. (2005) and others (Baysinger and Hoskisson 1989; Cloodt et al.
2006; Hitt et al. 1996) find empirical evidence that complementary technologies
yield economic benefits in acquisitions.
According to the ‘economies of sameness’ argument we derive the following
working hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3 Technological relatedness has a positive effect on acquisition
performance.
2.4 Size relatedness
Some authors assume that targets and buyers of similar size lead to better
knowledge integration and show the most efficient integration processes (Ahuja and
Katila 2001). In this case the acquirer is better prepared to recognize the value and
content of the acquired knowledge, to assimilate it, and to apply it (Cohen and
Levinthal 1990). It is easier to identify redundancies when both firms are of equal
size (Krishnan et al. 2007). This leads to workforce reductions resulting in cost
savings. These kinds of synergies are easily identified (Ficery et al. 2007).
Other authors argue, however, that size differences lead to higher synergies. Seth
(1990) supports the view that a small buyer acquiring a large target increases its
market power as well as economies of scope and scale. In contrast, Bruton et al.
(1994) argue that acquiring a relatively small target is associated with better
acquisition performance. The larger the acquired company the more complex the
organizational structures are. As a consequence the danger arises for the management
to lose control (Chakrabarti 1990; Ravenscraft and Scherer 1989). More management
and financial resources have to be devoted to the target, in particular when the target
firm is financially distressed. This is often the case with the acquisition of young
start-up companies (Fluck and Lynch 1999). It is assumed that only a significantly
larger buyer can provide these managerial and financial resources.7
Results on the profitability of size relatedness are mixed. Some authors
(Chatterjee and Wernerfelt 1991; Finkelstein and Haleblian 2002; Heeley et al.
2006; Kumar 1985; Papadakis 2005; Puranam and Srikanth 2007; Ravenscraft and
7 As single entities these projects would not exist. Fluck and Lynch (1999) consider this approach
consistent with diversified firms suffering from a conglomerate discount in financial markets and thus
displaying a lower value than focused firms. Nonetheless, in this case, the combined entity has a higher
value as compared to stand alone firms.
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Scherer 1989; Slangen 2006) find evidence for increased profitability when both
buyer and target are of similar size.
According to Scanlon et al. (1989) small firms acquiring related firms tend to
outperform large firms that acquire firms in unrelated businesses.8 The study of Seth
(1990) shows a similar result. However, he demonstrates that synergistic gains are
greater for large firms acquiring in related businesses as opposed to small firms
executing related acquisitions. Kusewitt (1985), Bruton et al. (1994) and others
(Baysinger and Hoskisson 1989; Hagedoorn and Duysters 2002; Hitt et al. 1991;
Moeller et al. 2004; Vermeulen and Barkema 2001) find that size relatedness is only
slightly connected to performance. Fuller et al. (2002) even find larger CARs the
smaller the target.9
According to the ‘integration’ argument, we derive the following working
hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4 Size relatedness has a positive effect on acquisition performance.
3 Research method
3.1 Applied method, former meta-analyses and methodical (dis)advantages
Our research is based on a meta-analysis of previous empirical studies that
examined the relationship between relatedness of the target firm and the acquiring
firm on subsequent acquisition performance. In contrast to other meta-analyses we
compare the effects of four different relatedness dimensions on acquisition
performance and we understand acquisition performance as a multi-dimensional
construct which includes among others knowledge indicators. The most compre-
hensive meta-analytic review of M&A by King et al. (2004) solely analyses the
effects of business relatedness on abnormal returns and accounting measures.
Larsson and Lubatkin (2001) as well as Stahl and Voigt (2008) concentrate on
cultural effects. They do not consider any kind of knowledge indicators or longevity
measure.
The advantages of meta-analysis are (1) quantification of surveys and results, (2)
conceivability by persons not involved in science, (3) replicability and impartiality.
Disadvantages are (1) comparability of the surveys, (2) integration of surveys of
differing quality, (3) ‘‘publication bias’’ in favor of published, significant results (4)
‘‘non-independent effects’’ in case a survey documents several correlations (Eisend
2004). Our study minimizes two disadvantages: firstly, non-independent effects are
reduced by applying subgroup-analyses. Secondly, comparability of different
surveys is enhanced by distinguishing between different performance-measurements
and by applying moderator analyses.
8 In Scanlon et al. (1989) abnormal returns for small-related acquisitions are positive but not significant
whereas for large acquisitions CARs are significantly negative.
9 However, this result only holds concerning public targets.
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3.2 Sample and sample bias
We collected the study sample by combining three research steps: (1) we conducted
computerized database searches in the Web of science using the key words
‘‘mergers’’, ‘‘acquisition’’, ‘‘M&A’’, ‘‘related/unrelated’’, ‘‘relatedness’’. (2) We
screened the cited and citing literature of prior meta-analysis on mergers and
acquisitions (Datta et al. 1992; King et al. 2004; Stahl and Voigt 2008). (3) We
screened the cited and citing literature of articles that examined the relationship
between relatedness and acquisition performance (e.g. Lubatkin 1987; Lubatkin and
Srinivasan 1997). We stopped the screening procedure only when no new studies
were found.
Our final sample has four major biases which should be considered when
interpreting the results. Firstly, our sample has a strong ‘‘publication bias’’ in favor
of results published in refereed journals and in the English language. Books, book
sections, working papers and non-refereed conference proceedings were excluded.
Secondly, only studies that were available were included, i.e. journals or periods of
journals not licensed by the university were excluded. Finally we stopped our search
procedure after not finding additional studies matching our criteria.
The final sample consists of 67 empirical studies (n = 23,391 M&As).10 The
studies document 479 statistical correlations between synergy variables, respec-
tively the size of the acquiring company and acquisition performance. Our sample
size is comparable with the samples of prior meta-analyses on M&As. The sample
of Datta et al. (1992) consists of 41 studies and 409 correlations. The recent sample
of Stahl and Voigt (2008) consists of 46 studies and a combined sample size of
10,710 M&As. The analysis of King et al. (2004) takes into account 93 studies, 852
correlations and a combined sample size of 15,305 M&As.11 Concerning the effects
of relatedness on acquisition performance, King et al. (2004) include 41 studies and
a combined sample size of 6,581 M&As.
The included studies cover a wide variety of industries: global chemicals, High-
Tech sector, IT- and pharmaceutical sector, semiconductor industry, industrial
manufacturing sector, non-financial firms or a random sample of all industries.
Concerning sample size the smallest sample includes 25 M&As, the largest 6,428
M&As. The median sample size across all studies is 479. The time period covered
ranges from 1948 up to 2002. More descriptive information on the study sample is
listed in Table 1.
3.3 Operationalization of relatedness
We coded the studies in terms of cultural, business, technological, and size
relatedness between target and buyer. A wide range of indicators was employed.
Table 10 in the Appendix gives a detailed overview. For the statistical analysis we
10 Included studies are listed in the reference section. Two studies are counted as four studies because
both studies use two independent samples.
11 In their study the authors talk about a combined sample size of 206,910 M&As. This number is
obtained by adding up sample sizes of different correlations from one study.
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recoded all distance measurements as relatedness measurements by inverting the
correlation sign. Recoding was especially important with respect to cultural
relatedness and to some measures of size relatedness.
Business relatedness is commonly assessed in four different ways: (1) objective
measures of relatedness by computing a diversification index based on the 2 and 4-
digit SIC code of the companies, (2) refinement of these measures by including an
entropy index and a Herfindahl-Index according to Palepu (1985), (3) qualitative
Table 1 Descriptive statistics of the 67 M&A studies included in the meta-analysis
Effect of relatedness on
performance
Business
relatedness
Culture
relatedness
Technology
relatedness
Size
relatedness
Absolute size
acquirer
Dependent variable
Number of studies (k) 46 21 12 19 13
Number of subgroups 254 77 58 48 42
Number of M&As (k) 12,268 4,372 2,692 2,526 10,461
Performance type Shareholder
value
Accounting
performance
Skill transfer
and combination
Overall acquisition
performance
Longevity
Moderator variables
Studies (k) 29 29 20 8 2
Subgroups 133 124 44 27 124
Time
effect
(-2,2) Days
after/before
announcement
(-10,10)
Days after/before
announcement
(-100,100)
Days after/before
announcement
(Pre-) acquisition
performance
Post-acquisition
performance
Studies (k) 5 11 9 30 31
Subgroups 16 39 53 133 238
Performance
effect
Performance
target firms
Performance
acquiring firms
Studies (k) 12 61
Subgroups 66 413
Knowledge-intensity
of the industry
High-Tech
industry
High- and Low-Tech
industry
Low-Tech
industry
Studies (k) 10 55 2
Subgroups 68 405 6
Acquisition size Large M&As Large and small M&As Small M&As
Studies (k) 39 25 3
Subgroups 265 200 14
Region Global M&As US M&As Europe M&As
Studies (k) 15 41 11
Subgroups 87 301 91
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approaches for classification as proposed by Rumelt (1974), Porter (1985) and Bettis
and Hall (1982), or (4) subjective measures of relatedness based on surveys or
expert judgments.
Cultural relatedness is commonly assessed in three different ways: (1) a
national cultural distance index by applying the approach of Kogut and Singh
(1988) and by using the differences in country scores of Hofstede’s (1980) four
dimensions of national culture, i.e. uncertainty avoidance, power distance,
individualism and masculinity, (2) bivariate variables distinguishing between
domestic and foreign expansions, (3) subjective measures of cultural differences
based on survey questions.
Technological relatedness is commonly assessed in three different ways: (1)
objective measures of relatedness by computing a diversification index based on the
IPC-classes of the companies patent stocks following Hall et al. (2001), (2) numbers
of patents that appeared in both the acquired and the acquiring firm’s knowledge
base, (3) subjective measures of a common technology base based on surveys or
expert judgments.
Size relatedness was coded in two ways: (1) a ratio of target to acquirer size by
using assets, revenues, sales, number of employees, (2) surveys or expert judgments
by employing scales ranging from ‘‘the acquiring firm is smaller in size’’ to ‘‘the
acquiring firm is more than ten times the size of the acquired firm.’’ All
measurements of size relatedness were recoded in the following way: larger scores
indicate a larger relative size of the target.
Absolute size of the acquirer was included as an additional variable. Larger
acquirers might have greater power to absorb a new unit and thus are more able to
realize potential synergies (Seth 1990). We included the well-known size effect as a
control variable in order to visualize the relative effects of relatedness on acquisition
performance and for reasons of interpretation. Most studies measured size by using
assets, sales or number of employees of the acquiring company.
3.4 Operationalization of acquisition performance
The dependent variable ‘‘acquisition performance’’ can be assessed against a wide
variety of benchmarks. For example an acquisition can provide access to new
markets or to new technologies while being unprofitable from a financial viewpoint
at the same time. In contrast, an acquisition that provides tax benefits and other
financial values does not necessarily lead to new technologies or access to new
markets. Because of this multi-dimensionality we use several performance
constructs.
The success of acquisitions normally is assessed using the event study method.
Event studies analyze the market’s reaction around the merger announcement date
and calculate CARs (see, e.g. Brown and Warner 1980; MacKinlay 1997). The
drawback of this method is its reliance on the semi-strong form of the market
efficiency hypothesis which is disputable. Another drawback is its strong focus on
financial investors. Financial investors are interested in short-term monetary gains
(King et al. 2004; Schoenberg 2006). However, these gains might not be sustainable
and can represent stock market anomalies or stock market reactions with respect to
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the chosen accounting method (Robinson and Shane 1990).12 For example, some
private equity companies ‘‘(…) simply take a business private, load it with debt,
strip its assets, then sell it a few months later for multiples of the purchase price
(…)’’ (Kiechel 2007, p. 18). For this reason the market’s reaction around the merger
announcement date might be a good measurement of M&A-gains of financial
investors but not necessarily of strategic investors and blockholders.
Long term sustainable competitive advantage in M&A is achieved via operating
efficiency, new product developments and patenting activities, basic R&D,
knowledge transfer and combination and the longevity of executed M&A.
Therefore, the long-term success of acquisitions can be assessed via these
indicators.
We classified the studies in terms of five different performance types. As with
relatedness the studies employ a wide range of indicators in order to measure one
specific performance type. Table 11 in the Appendix gives a detailed overview.
Objective standard performance was measured by distinguishing between the
shareholder value of the M&A and the accounting performance of the combined
company.
Shareholder value is commonly measured via abnormal returns (CAR, MCAR),
wealth effects, performance in market share, earning per share growth, stock
returns, or percent change in market value.
Accounting performance was measured as (1) the absolute EBITDA, ROA,
ROE, ROS, sales of the combined company as well as the growth of these
indicators, or (2) the growth in sales, etc. as indicated by respondents.
Skill transfer and combination captures acquisition performance with respect
to innovation and knowledge as the basis of sustainable competitive advantage. The
included studies employ the following measures: (1) leverage of innovation
capabilities and knowledge based on patent authorship data or on patent citations,
(2) changes in R&D intensity, new product intensity, number of patents, patent
intensity growth, (3) subjective measures of skill and resource transfer, of new
product development, of innovation, technology or R&D field growth based on
surveys or expert judgments.
Overall acquisition performance measures the impact of M&A on combined
performance. Usually subjective measurements are employed: (1) a combination of
multiple survey questions capturing the extent of synergy realization through
realized benefits from purchasing, production, marketing, market power, adminis-
tration, vertical economies, new market access, cross-selling, know-how transfer,
knowledge creation, etc., (2) expert evaluations of executives and analysts regarding
the financial and strategic benefits from the acquisition.
Longevity (1) measures whether the acquired company was divested by the
parent company or (2) captures the number of years a venture persisted. These
measurements were recoded in the following way: larger scores indicate longer
survivals.
12 So called ‘‘purchase’’ accountings tend to perform better, but ‘‘pooling’’ accounting has been abolished
in the meantime (Lindenberg and Ross 1999). Andrade (1999) finds that the accounting method is used by
acquirers to improve earnings dilution effects.
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3.5 Operationalization of other performance classifications
In order to check for alternative performance effects, we recoded the dependent
variable ‘‘acquisition performance’’ to capture time effects and performance effects.
To capture time effects we recoded the dependent variable acquisition
performance in the following way: (1) market reactions around 2 days before and
2 days after the merger announcement date, (2) market reactions around 10 days
before and 10 days after the merger announcement date, (3) market reactions
around 100 days before and 100 days after the merger announcement date, (4)
strategic performance measures, e.g., accounting measures or skill transfer and
combination, observed within (or even before) the acquisition year, (5) strategic
performance measures observed after the acquisition year.
To capture performance effects that might influence acquisition performance we
coded the studies in terms of (1) performance measured for acquirers/combined
firms and (2) performance measured for target firms (Stahl and Voigt 2008).
3.6 Operationalization of moderator variables
The inconsistent results in M&A research might be partially a consequence of
contingencies which moderate the effect of relatedness on acquisition performance.
Moderator variables firstly help to substantiate main results. Secondly, they help to
explain insignificant or small effects as positive effects may be obtained for one
characteristic of the moderator while negative effects may be obtained for a
different characteristic. In order to check for such effects, we coded four moderator
variables independent of the introduced measurements which might moderate
acquisition performance.
Knowledge-intensity of the industry (Cloodt et al. 2006): we classified the
studies as follows: (1) studies solely observing M&As in the High-Tech industry,
(2) studies observing random samples, i.e. M&As in High- and Low-Tech firms, (3)
studies solely observing M&As in the Low-Tech industry.
Acquisition size Acquisitions of large targets are often expected to be more
successful in related acquisitions (Seth 1990). We arrange the studies as follows: (1)
studies solely observing large M&As, (2) studies observing random samples, i.e.
large and small M&As, (3) studies solely observing small M&As.
Region (Hofstede 2001): The studies were distinguished between (1) studies
observing global M&As, (2) studies solely observing US M&As, (3) studies solely
observing European M&As. There was no study for M&As in Asia.
3.7 Coding and inter-rater agreement
Depending on the available information we collected data on (1) correlation values
and overall sample size, (2) mean values, standard deviations and group sample
size, or (3) mean values, t values and group sample size. Twenty-six studies of the
67 studies were coded by two independent raters (the second author and a student
about to obtain his diploma). The interrater reliability was measured by the
percentage agreement (Orwin 1994). This percentage amounts to 93% suggesting
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that the coding process produced reliable data. The remaining studies where coded
by the second author.13
3.8 Method
We used the software ‘‘comprehensive meta analysis’’ (Borenstein et al. 2007). It
transforms different statistical information into Fisher’s Z using the approach of
Hunter and Schmidt (2004). We checked for publication outliers by plotting a
study’s effect size against its standard error. The studies were almost symmetrically
distributed demonstrating the absence of distorting publication bias. In contrast to
some meta-analyses we did not correct the unreliability of studies based on self-
reported measures (King et al. 2004), even though we checked for systematic errors.
The standardised mean effects of self-report and of objective measures do not vary
significantly (P = 0.62).
To ensure an acceptable level of independence among studies with multiple
subgroups, effect sizes were averaged when a study provided multiple indicators of
the same variable, e.g., different indicators for business relatedness (King et al.
2004). When a study documented multiple subgroups, we determined a total effect
d. For correlations r this effect is calculated as follows:
di ¼ 2riﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1  r2i
p ð1Þ
Finally, we calculate an average effect Cohen’s d for the total sample and for
each kind of outcome measurement respectively. The effect is corrected for
sampling errors. We are using fixed-effect-models, i.e. the correlations are weighted
by the sample size of a study. The fixed-effect approach builds on the assumption of
an overall population parameter, whereby the effects of a single study randomly
differ from the error in the overall sample. The total effect is calculated from the
study-specific weights w, as follows:
Cohen’s d ¼
P
widið Þ
P
wi
ð2Þ
The results were checked for their internal homogeneity. A significant Q value is
evidence of variability of study-level effect sizes and thus indicates the existence of
moderator variables.
Q ¼
X
k
i¼1
wi di  dð Þ2 ð3Þ
We tested for significant moderator effects by comparing the mean effect sizes
between the subgroups by means of a critical ratio tests (Borenstein et al. 2007). We
performed subgroup analyses independent of the number of included studies. The
convention is that each subgroup should contain a minimum of three studies (Dalton
13 In some cases variables had to be coded in opposite directions in order to measure the effect of
relatedness (and not of distance) on performance (and not on without-performance).
88 F. Homberg et al.
123
et al. 2003). For this reason we only interpret subgroup effects which are calculated
on this minimum.
4 Results
Firstly, we show the overall effects of each relatedness dimension on acquisition
performance. Secondly, we illustrate how each relatedness dimension contributes to
different performance measures. Thirdly, we demonstrate how each relatedness
dimension contributes to acquisition performance depending on contingencies. The
results are discussed in Sect. 5.
4.1 Relatedness and overall performance
Overall relatedness, i.e. the composite index of all relatedness types, is not
correlated with overall acquisition performance (-0.001). Furthermore, business
relatedness (0.018*) and technology relatedness (0.070**) are positively linked
with overall acquisition performance, while cultural relatedness (-0.132***) and
size relatedness (-0.070**) are negatively linked with overall acquisition
performance. The findings substantiate hypotheses H1 and H3 and reject hypotheses
H2 and H4. Table 2 shows that the absolute size of the acquiring company is
negatively linked with overall acquisition performance (-0.035***).
4.2 Relatedness and performance measures
Table 3 documents how relatedness affects different performance types. Overall
relatedness has no impact on the shareholder value (-0.010), the transfer of skills
and resources (-0.005), and on overall acquisition performance (-0.018), whereas
it positively influences accounting performance (0.033*) and negatively longevity
(-0.219***; 2 studies).
Distinguishing relatedness types we find that business relatedness enhances the
transfer and combination of skills and resources (0.123***) and overall acquisition
performance (0.163***) while having no influence on shareholder value and
accounting performance. Cultural relatedness has strong negative effects on
shareholder value (-0.307***) and overall acquisition performance (-0.149***).
The performance effects of technology relatedness are mixed: technology related-
ness increases the shareholder value (0.231***) and the accounting performance
(0.295**), while decreasing the transfer and combination of skills and resources
(-0.318***). Size relatedness has negative effects on accounting performance
(-0.250***), indicating that larger acquirers relative to the target are in some
respects more successful. These findings match the findings about absolute size:
acquirers with a large absolute size earn higher accounting gains (0.231***) than
acquirers with a small absolute size. However, acquirers with a large absolute size
display lower shareholder value (-0.516***) and have a lower skill transfer and
combination measure (-0.091***) than acquirers with a small absolute size. The
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effects of relatedness on the longevity of M&As are not discussed because the
sample mainly consists of one study.
Table 4 documents how relatedness impacts performance dependent on time. In
the short-run overall relatedness has positive effects as indicated by the increase of
shareholder value in the 5-day-window14 around the announcement date (0.67***).
However, studies using larger time windows discover the opposite (-0.031/-
0.137***). Studies relying on other performance measurements than stock markets
find no effects of relatedness on the performance in the acquisition year (0.020) and
on post-acquisition performance (0.007).
On the level of each relatedness variable we find that business relatedness has
only short-term performance effects as indicated by the increase of shareholder
value in the 5-day-window (0.067***) and the increase of the strategic performance
within the acquisition year (0.068***). In the long run business relatedness
decreases performance as indicated by its negative effects on shareholder value in
the 201-day-window15 around the announcement (-0.170***) or it has no effects as
indicated by its influence on post-acquisition performance (0.012). Cultural
relatedness has stronger negative effects in the short-term (-0.374***/-0.083*)
than in the long run (-0.158/0.060), while technology relatedness has positive
effects in the long run (0.194**). The negative effects of size relatedness are more
pronounced in the short-term (-0.162***) than in the long run (-0.081**). Finally,
compared with smaller acquirers larger acquirers perform poorer within the
acquisition year (-0.042***), but show no performance difference in the post-
acquisition period (0.049).
Table 5 documents how relatedness impacts the performance of targets and
buyers. Overall relatedness is negatively associated with the performance of targets
(-0.090***) and has no impact on the performance of the acquiring respectively the
combined company (0.006).
Distinguishing relatedness types we find that cultural relatedness (-0.474*** vs.
-0.006*) is linked with a poorer performance of targets supporting the former
result.
4.3 Relatedness dependent on contingencies
Table 6 shows how relatedness depends on the knowledge intensity of the industry.
Striking is the low number of M&A-studies conducted within the Low-Tech-
industry even though acquisitions are very common, e.g., the current tendency of
building contractors acquiring facility service providers. Because of the small
sample size we interpret only the results of the High-Tech industry and the mixed
sample, i.e. studies sampling High- and Low-Tech firms. The results indicate that
relatedness overall has no effects on acquisition performance both in the mixed
sample (-0.005) and in High-Tech-industries (0.030).
14 The 5-day-window covers days -2 to ?2 relative to the transaction announcement date as mentioned
in Sect. 3.5.
15 The 201-day-window covers days -100 to ?100 relative to the transaction announcement date as
mentioned in Sect. 3.5.
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When relatedness types are distinguished, the results show that business
relatedness increases the performance in the High-Tech industry (0.213***) but
has no effects in the mixed sample (0.006), while size relatedness has no effect in
the High-Tech industry but decreases performance in the mixed sample (-0.070*).
Finally, technology relatedness leads to performance declines in the High-Tech
industry (-0.211***) while increasing performance in the mixed sample
(0.152***). The absolute size of the acquirer involves higher performance declines
in the High-Tech sector (-0.084**) compared to the mixed sample (-0.027**).
Table 7 shows how relatedness depends on acquisition size. Most studies analyze
samples of large but not of small M&A; we therefore interpret the results of large
and mixed samples only. The analysis demonstrates that overall relatedness has no
effects in large M&As (-0.011) and in mixed samples (0.006).
A more detailed analysis shows that business relatedness decreases the
performance in large M&A (-0.030*) while increasing the performance in the
mixed sample (0.062***). Cultural relatedness has smaller negative effects in large
M&A (-0.097*) compared with the mixed sample (-0.167***). Technology
relatedness shows positive performance effects in large M&A (0.144***) while
showing negative effects in the mixed sample (-0.163***). Finally, the absolute
size of the acquirer has more pronounced negative performance effects in samples
looking at large M&As (-0.095**) than in mixed samples (-0.020).
Table 8 demonstrates how relatedness depends on regions. The findings indicate
that overall relatedness has a neutral effect in samples referring to global or US
acquirers (0.005/0.003) while it seems to decrease the performance in samples
referring to European acquirers (-0.042).
When relatedness types are distinguished, the results show that business
relatedness has significant and positive effects for global-acquirers only
(0.165***). Cultural relatedness decreases the performance independent of region
(-0.123**/-0.156**/-0.142**). The results reveal that technology relatedness
significantly increases the performance of US-acquirers (0.164***). Size relatedness
shows significant and negative effects by US-acquirers (-0.125***). This finding is
substantiated by the effects of absolute size: while size pays off for US-acquirers
(0.073*), it involves losses for global- as well as for European-acquirers
(-0.035***/-0.676***).
5 Discussion
Table 9 summarizes the study’s findings. The overall message is that synergies
indeed exist in mergers and acquisitions. However, these synergies can arise due to
either similarities or due to dissimilarities between the acquirer and the target. The
optimal amount of relatedness or of differences strongly depends on (a) the interests
of major investors as indicated by the performance measurements of financial (e.g.
with respect to shareholder value) and strategic investors (e.g. with respect to skill
transfer and combination; Table 3, Sect. 4.2), (b) the organizational goals as
indicated by time effects (Table 4, Sect. 4.2), (c) other interests groups (Table 5,
Sect. 4.2), e.g., the employees of the target, as indicated by target and buyer effects,
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(d) industry characteristics as indicated by the knowledge-intensity of firms
(Table 6, Sect. 4.3), (e) firm size (Table 7, Sect. 4.3), (f) institutional- and country-
specific characteristics as indicated by region (Table 8, Sect. 4.3).
The results allow more precise predictions according to three topics:
Firstly, we concentrate on overall performance and on the contribution each
single relatedness construct makes to it. Secondly, we consider different investor
types, i.e. strategic investors vs. financial investors, different time horizons of
performance measures, and the performance of the target or of the acquirer
respectively. Thirdly, we turn to the moderators.
Ad 1: The overall effect of relatedness on performance is negligible. It is also
possible that synergies exist but that their effect is too small to pay-off a (high)
acquisition premium. Nonetheless, the single dimensions of relatedness have
different impacts. Moderate positive effects on overall performance stem from both
business and technological relatedness. In contrast, cultural relatedness displays a
strong negative effect on overall performance, and size relatedness exhibits a
moderate negative effect. To summarize the first topic:
• Synergies due to relatedness arise in M&A when firms work in similar
businesses and build on similar technologies but at the same time have
dissimilar cultures.
• The acquirer should be larger than the target.
• Synergies will decrease if the absolute size of a buyer is too large.
These findings are supported by prior research: The meta-analysis of Stahl and
Voigt (2008) supports the finding that cultural distance might be an overall ‘‘success
factor’’ by showing that cultural relatedness reduces socio-cultural integration
efforts. Principal-agent theory further supports the negative influence of absolute
size on acquisition success by reasoning that especially managers of big companies
are more entrenched and thus find ways to bypass the interests of shareholders (Tosi
et al. 2000). The absolute size finding is also in line with the firm size distribution,
which is significantly skewed to the right with a large peak for the smallest size
class (Laincz and Rodrigues 2005), indicating that a healthy growth of big firms is
naturally limited.
Ad 2: Different investor types apply different performance criteria. We define
financial investors as being mainly interested in shareholder value whereas strategic
investors are mainly interested in a composite of skill transfer and combination,
longevity, accounting performance and overall performance. Table 9 classifies
different investor types and their benefits from the single relatedness dimensions
according to our results. Financial investors profit from technological relatedness
and small M&A (i.e. the acquirer should be smaller in absolute size). Strategic
investors benefit from business relatedness, from size differences (i.e. the acquirer
should be larger than the target) and from large M&A (i.e. the acquirer should be
larger in absolute size). Both financial and strategic investors benefit if both
companies have dissimilar cultures.
Furthermore, synergies differ with respect to short and long run performance
measures. Short run measures comprise of short-time frames (-2,2 and -10,10) as
well as the (pre-) acquisition performance measures (see Table 4) and thus are more
100 F. Homberg et al.
123
interesting for financial investors. Long run measures comprise of long time frame
(-100,100) and the post-acquisition performance measures and thus are more
interesting for strategic investors (see Table 4). A financial theorist would argue that
the short-time frames also reflect long run shareholder expectations. However, even
in financial studies there is a distinction between short run and long run event
studies: ‘‘while the exact definition of ‘‘long horizon’’ is arbitrary, it generally
applies to event windows of 1 year or more.’’ (Kothari and Warner 2004, p. 7).
Thus, an exact allocation of benefits to financial or strategic investors based on time
frames cannot be made with certainty.
In the short run synergies arise from business relatedness. In the long run
synergies arise from technological relatedness. Synergies in M&A can be expected
both in the short and in the long run if the cultures between both companies differ
and if the acquirer is larger in size than the target.
Synergies also differ with respect to the acquirer’s and target’s performance.
Whereas acquirers and their investors benefit from synergies due to business
relatedness, the target does not benefit. Only in the case of cultural distance are the
investors of both groups able to increase their performance.
Ad 3. Synergy effects by relatedness are moderated by knowledge intensity,
absolute size and region. They are summarized in Table 9.
The first moderator is the knowledge intensity of the industry. Synergies arise
• in M&A in the High-Tech sector if both companies work in similar businesses
but build on complementary technologies. The acquirer should be not too large
in absolute size.
• in M&A in the Medium-Tech sector if both companies have dissimilar cultures
but build on similar technologies. The acquirer should be overall not too large in
absolute size but larger than the target.
As a result, in knowledge intensive sectors similarity in valuable knowledge
stocks boosts problems (e.g. technology relatedness) while similarity in surrounding
factors (e.g. business models) reduces problems. The opposite is true for sectors
which build less on knowledge.
The second moderator considers the absolute size of acquisitions. Synergies arise
• in large M&A if both companies work in dissimilar businesses, have dissimilar
cultures, but build on similar technologies. The acquirer should be larger than
the target.
• in medium M&A if both companies work in similar businesses but have
dissimilar cultures and build on complementary technologies. The acquirer
should be larger than the target.
• in large as well as in medium M&A the synergies will decrease if the absolute
size of a buyer is very large.
These results show that technology relatedness helps to overcome some of the
problems in large M&A. This finding is in line with the result that absolute firm size
hinders the transfer and combination of knowledge in M&A. In contrast, small firms
profit from technological complementarities.
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The third moderator is the region according to the sample of M&A used in each
study. Synergies arise
• in global M&A if both companies work in similar businesses but have dissimilar
cultures. However, if the absolute size of a buyer is very large the synergies will
decrease
• in US M&A if both companies have dissimilar cultures but build on similar
technologies. The buyer company should be larger than the target. Buyers with a
larger absolute size earn higher synergies.
• in European M&A if both companies have dissimilar cultures. The buyer
company should be larger than the target. However, if the absolute size of a
buyer is very large the synergies will decrease.
These results substantiate the argument that the effects of relatedness on
acquisition performance are dependent on the region. As indicated by the opposite
results of firm size on acquisition success in US and European M&A country-
specific institutions are important. Many European companies are characterized by
strong labor unions, co-determination and protection against dismissals.16 These
institutions affect the market for corporate control by complicating M&A of large
firms. The findings imply that research results, especially results published in
American journals, should be transferred to Europe with care.
To summarize the results of all three topics, our findings indicate that synergies
depend on a wide variety of factors such as industry-, country, law- and investor-
characteristics and are considerably low. The relatedness hypothesis should also be
discussed by including different interest groups, e.g., financial and strategic
investors and contingencies like knowledge intensity of the industry or country
specific effects. As a consequence synergies due to relatedness are not able to
explain the huge acquisition activities in the last decades to a sufficient extent. Other
explanations have to be found.
6 Conclusion
6.1 Contributions
Our study first highlights the ineffectiveness of synergies due to relatedness on the
overall performance level. The analysis clearly shows that together such synergies
are negligible.
Second we analyze the effect of four different dimensions of relatedness, i.e.
business, cultural, technological and size relatedness, on different aspects of
acquisition performance. Moderate positive effects on overall acquisition perfor-
mance stem from business and technological relatedness. Cultural relatedness
displays a strong negative effect on overall performance, and size relatedness
16 Of the former EU-25 11 countries have strong co-determination laws: Austria, Czech Republic,
Denmark, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Sweden. In
the UK, Greece, France, Italy and Spain such labor laws are absent. In the UK the influence of labor
unions is dependent on the business segment.
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exhibits a moderate negative effect. Furthermore, since different investor types
apply different performance criteria, an acquisition should satisfy both groups.
However, synergies due to relatedness only arise for different investor types in the
case of cultural distance.
Thirdly, our study points at the complexity of synergy assessments. We have
shown that synergies are dependent on a variety of additional factors (such as
country characteristics or time effects).
Fourthly, we applied multi-faceted performance criteria. We not only distin-
guished between accounting and market based measures but introduced knowledge
indicators, e.g., skill transfer and combination, as measures of success. Knowledge
indicators capture acquisition performance with respect to innovation and knowl-
edge. Thus, they can be interpreted as the grounds on which sustainable competitive
advantage is built as opposed to mere financial indicators.
Fifthly we provide evidence that the absolute size of an acquirer is extremely
important and cannot be neglected. Our results suggest that smaller acquirers are
more likely to profit from M&A, therefore underlining that growth of firms is
naturally limited.
As a consequence for practice, the board of directors as well as shareholders are
well advised not to rely on promises of synergies due to relatedness on an overall
level given by their executives. These results are in line with analyses of, e.g.,
Ku¨rsten (2008) and others (see, e.g. King et al. 2004) who provide analytical and
empirical evidence that shareholders are best advised to doubt promises of synergies
made by executives when acquiring other firms.
6.2 Limitations
Our study has a number of limitations as mentioned in Sects. 3.1 and 3.2. Firstly,
our sample has a strong ‘‘publication bias’’ in favor of results published in refereed
journals and in the English language. Secondly, only studies that were available
were included, i.e. publications licensed by the university.
We tried to minimize some disadvantages through properly applied methods of
analysis and by including control and moderator variables. Firstly, non-independent
effects are reduced by applying subgroup-analyses. Secondly, comparability of
different surveys is enhanced by distinguishing between different performance-
measurements and by applying moderator analyses.
6.3 Further research
Further research could take numerous directions. One could be to intensify the
research on different contingency factors like country differences, investor
characteristics or sector affiliations. Thus, other methods than meta-analysis could
be applied. For example, Bruner (2005) presents a series of detailed case studies in
his analysis of factors contributing to M&A failures.
A second option would be to start with the finding that synergies are
overestimated. Two explanations for the huge amount of M&A activities have
already been proposed. The first explanation is the empire building of managers
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(Sudarsanam 1995). According to this view managers pursue M&As for self-serving
reasons such as high salaries, prestige or power which are facilitated by takeovers
(Morck et al. 1990). In this case the decision-maker is purposely acting against
shareholder interests. This implies that no matter how good the controls are the
decision maker will try to find ways to bypass them. Thus, future research could
investigate the effects of for example, draconian sanctions for executives. Another
promising direction is to assess the benefits and powers of new control modes, for
example; how trust has proven to be very powerful in governing business relations.
Moreover, research on management incentives can be pushed in other directions.
Since monetary rewards have proven not to be optimal incentives, boards should be
willing to find incentives that do not trigger self-interested behavior, e.g., a focus on
intrinsic motivations.
A second proposition is the hubris hypothesis (Roll 1986). According to this
hypothesis managers systematically overestimate their abilities. They are convinced
that they have the ability to identify hidden synergies and pick promising targets that
others cannot (Doukas and Petmezas 2007, p. 537). To date only few measures for
managerial hubris exist, e.g., in terms of media praise for the CEO (see, e.g.
Chatterjee and Hambrick 2007; Hayward and Hambrick 1997; Malmendier and Tate
2005; Malmendier and Tate 2008). If a management’s hubris is the major driver for
acquisition decisions, it is a good alternative to consider external opinions, such as
investment banks or consultancies. Acquisition plans can also be reviewed internally
by acquisition committees. Since management hubris occurs subconsciously and is a
form of delusion it cannot be regulated by the individual. Therefore it is different
from the managerial motives which result in conscious self-serving behavior such as
empire building. Hence, future research should assess which institutions are in the
strongest position to limit management decisions affected by hubris. A good starting
point would be the literature on decision traps (Russo and Schoemaker 1990) and
psychological economics (Kahnemann and Tversky 1986). A combination of these
two research avenues promises to explain the extent of M&A activities.
Appendix A
See Tables 10 and 11.
Table 10 Operationalization of relatedness and firm size within the studies
Business relatedness
2 and 4-digit SIC industries measure of diversification, approach of Rumelt (1974): firms in different IO
industries merge and the merging firms show no vertical relatedness
2 and 4-digit SIC industries measure of entropy, approach of Palepu (1985)
Conglomerate/unrelated mergers as classified by the FTC, Rumelt (1974) typology
Extent to which an acquiring firm’s primary SIC codes were related to the target firm’s primary SIC
codes
Those in the same 2- or 3-digit industry as an acquirer’s primary industry
Combination potential
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Table 10 continued
Extent of backward (supplier) and forward (processing or distributing) linkage
Percentage of acquired assets of the same 2-digit SIC code as the acquirer
Similarity between acquirers and targets on strategic variables
Judges classified the acquisition as ‘related’
Interviews with managers
Firms that produced similar products or served the same or similar customers
Relatedness of the acquisition as indicated by respondents
Expansion took place within a firms value-added chain…
Culture relatedness
National cultural distance through the Kogut and Singh (1988) index based on the differences in country
scores on each of Hofstede’s (1980) four dimensions of national culture, i.e., uncertainty avoidance,
power distance, individualism, and masculinity
Cultural differences index across several dimensions
Cultural distance, based on Ronen and Shenkar’s (1985) classification (RSINDEX; ranging from 1, when
the host country belonged to the Nordic block, to 8, in the case of Africa).
Crossborder mergers comparing the headquarters in different countries
Domestic expansion, foreign expansion
Share of international M&As in the total number of its M&As as registered according to the home
country of the headquarters of companies during the period
Comparing manager responses
Technology relatedness
Diversity measure of breadth of the firm’s patent stock; citation count following Hall, Jaffe, and
Trajtenberg (2001); each cited patent is identified by International Patent Class (IPC) and related to the
distribution of its application across industries
(Dis)similarity of the patent classification (IPC) code of the patents owned by the M&A partners at the
three digit level
Common technology base
Presence of technological relationships between acquirer and target.
List of patent numbers that appeared in both the acquired firm’s knowledge base and in the acquiring
firm’s knowledge base
Size relatedness
Ratio of target to acquirer assets/revenues/sales/number of employees
Scales ranging from ‘‘smaller in size’’ to ‘‘more than ten times the size’’, respectively from ‘smaller’,
‘3–5 times the size’, to ‘more than 10 times the size’ as indicated by respondents
Absolute size acquirer
Number of employees, assets, sales
Table 11 Operationalization of acquisition performance within the studies
Shareholder value
Abnormal returns (CAR, MCAR), wealth effects, performance in market share, earning per share
growth, Stock Returns, Percent change in market value
Accounting performance
(Growth in) EBITDA, ROA, ROE, ROS, Sales, net income (after taxes), total assets
Scales about growth in Sales, etc. as indicated by respondents
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